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THINKING THROUGH U.S. STRATEGIC OPTIONS
FOR AFRICA
General Carlton W. Fulford, Jr., U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)
For the past decade, much has been debated and written about U.S. securityinterests in Africa. The George W. Bush administration has demonstrated a
heightened awareness of Africa’s importance to American geopolitical and eco-
nomic interests as well as sensitivity to the continent’s humanitarian challenges.
The 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy identifies Africa as “a high priority”
and “recognizes that our security depends upon partnering with Africans to
strengthen fragile and failing states and bring ungoverned areas under the con-
trol of effective democracies.”1 To this end, the Bush administration has signifi-
cantly increased aid, developmental assistance, military assistance, and other
economic investments over any previous administration.2 Moreover, it has
taken the important step of creating a unified combatant command for Africa,
which “will strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and help to create
new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africa and help
bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals
of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in
Africa.”3
Africa Command, or AFRICOM, is a sensible and innovative mechanism for
addressing U.S. security relationships with African nations and institutions. It
reached full operational capability in October 2008 and will demonstrate sincere
U.S. intentions for support to Africans while raising American awareness and
understanding of both the security and humanitarian challenges on the African
continent. AFRICOM will also help American policy makers understand the im-
portance of the strategic relationship with Africa and move us from an era of
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crisis-response relationships to a more mature partnership in order to foster
stronger relationships on the continent and a more stable, secure environment
for African citizens.
To date, however, the United States has neither publicly defined its own stra-
tegic goals and objectives with regard to Africa nor effectively coordinated its ac-
tions across various departments and agencies of the U.S. government. This has
led to suspicion on the African continent as well as uncertainty among other
U.S. allies about Washington’s true intent. The purpose of this article is to present
a framework for such a strategy—a “white paper on Africa”—and encourage the
next administration to form promptly a task force to define a U.S. strategy. This
strategy should lead to coordinated interagency actions and to engagement and
actions with other supportive governments, as well as representatives of responsi-
ble nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and civil-society groups in the
United States and in Africa.
A VISION FOR AFRICA
The first step is to establish a long-term vision for Africa in which its citizens’
economic and human security needs are addressed and the strategic interests of
the United States are protected. Formulating such a vision requires a more gran-
ular understanding of Africa and its constituent nations and people than the
United States has customarily brought to bear on policy. This vision must be
couched in reality and must be achievable within a definable time frame. I offer
the following as a straw man—fully cognizant that before it is accepted as valid
this vision must be discussed and coordinated with a wide audience: within our
government, with Africans, and with other nations and institutions.
Africa is a continent made up of stable, well-governed nations, committed to
peaceful coexistence and international order, contributing to the global economy,
and rewarding its citizens with freedom, security, and prosperity.
When discussing Africa—if not the entire continent, certainly the sub-Saharan
region—people often speak as if Africa were a single nation. In fact, Africa com-
prises fifty-three unique and different nations (fifty-four, if you include Western
Sahara) and a population approaching a billion people—a sixth of the world’s to-
tal. Some nations are democratic, some autocratic, and many are somewhere in
between. Some are well governed, by leaders who want what is best for their citi-
zens and have visions for the future. Some are governed poorly, by leaders who
seemingly are interested only in preserving their own power bases or further en-
riching themselves. Poverty is rampant in many of the countries, yet some are
blessed with abundant natural resources that could be developed; these coun-
tries, given the required investment in technology and value-adding industrial
assets, could be transformed into modern, wealthy states. Other nations are
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without these natural resources and also suffer from lack of water, fertile soil,
temperate climate, or other means of sustaining their citizens. Corruption is a
major factor in many African nations. Some of the world’s most devout Chris-
tians and Muslims can be found throughout the continent, and with just about
equal representation. In Africa one finds Nobel laureates, esteemed poets, and
educators. One also finds vast numbers of the uneducated, unemployed, impov-
erished, and hopeless.
Africa is a very diverse landscape that does not respond to a unitary,
one-size-fits-all solution. Africa also has a long history of being exploited, a fac-
tor that contributes greatly to suspicions that exist today. This history must be
understood and appreciated as U.S. strategy is developed. Europe, Asia, and the
United States have all seen Africa as a source of labor and natural resources and
generally have taken what they wanted. No one can go back and rewrite history
or make right all the wrongs of centuries, but we can be sensitive to this history
as we forge our way ahead.
Finally, and significantly, Africans are not anti-American. It is true that they
are suspicious of American intentions, a bit envious of what they see as dispro-
portionate American wealth, and that they see Americans as sometimes arro-
gant and overbearing, but they like America and the ideals it advocates. The U.S.
strategy should understand and build on this fact.
STRATEGIC COMPONENTS
I propose that the U.S. strategy focus on governance, security, and economic op-
portunity. If the nations of Africa are to succeed in this age of globalization, they
must have all three of these strategic components. Failure of any of the three will
cause the other components to fail and ultimately thrust the affected country
into chaos and turmoil. Furthermore, to be successful, America’s strategic rela-
tionship with Africa cannot rely on military, diplomatic, commercial, or hu-
manitarian relationships alone. Only by coordinating actions across a broad
engagement front can the United States effectively support Africa in building a
civil society and attaining a better quality of life for its citizens while achieving
the vision I am proposing.
Governance
Governance is fundamental to building a stable nation but has often been over-
looked in planning efforts to develop strategic relationships with countries in
Africa. The challenge of putting in place an effective, accountable government is
formidable. The United States and other nations tend to accept what is in place
and are reluctant to attempt to alter the internal relationships between the peo-
ple of a nation and the government that represents them. Consequently, it often
F U L F O R D 3 3
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appears the United States is more concerned with regime security than national
security.4 A few decades ago, there were divisive political debates over U.S. for-
eign policy emphasis on human rights within the countries with whom we inter-
acted. During the Cold War, when ideological alignments were paramount, the
prevailing view was that the United States put itself at a strategic or economic
disadvantage by focusing on the “internal affairs” of a nation. Emphasis on good
governance in the twenty-first century could be viewed as an evolutionary man-
ifestation of human rights. Today, an increasing number of key leaders on both
sides agree that governance is a key component of stability and that supporting
nations have the moral justification to concern themselves with this component.
Dictating what kind of government a nation chooses and publicly assessing
how well that government executes its responsibilities can, if carried to ex-
tremes, become symbols of arrogance and barriers to productive support. That
said, the United States should endeavor to apply baseline standards to African
nations—standards reflecting American values as well as those of any nation
with whom the United States elects to build partnerships. To take an extreme ex-
ample, the actions of the government of Sudan with respect to its citizens in
Darfur are governance practices that the international community should refuse
to accept. The same goes, with only slightly less force, for Robert Mugabe in
Zimbabwe. There are other signs of poor governance on the African continent
that the U.S. and other governments should refuse to recognize as acceptable.
More broadly, the United States can help build more effective governance by
setting standards higher than it has in the past—against corruption, fraudulent
elections, human rights abuses, and human trafficking. The United States
should not condone such abuses in Africa any more than it would in any other
part of the world. Rather, American leaders should work with responsible Afri-
can leadership to define acceptable universal standards of governance to ensure
that the cultures and identities of African citizens are preserved. These standards
should be applied consistently and comprehensively in our relations with each
country, providing support and assistance only to those governments meeting
the standards. In those countries failing to meet the standards, the United States
should seek ways to provide humanitarian support and hope through
nongovernmental and responsible civil organizations, while exposing and con-
demning poorly performing African governments. This will require discipline
within the U.S. interagency across economic, commercial, diplomatic, and secu-
rity relationships. Once the United States demonstrates intolerance of poor gov-
ernance over the spectrum of these activities, governments will change and
conditions will be set for progress in security and economic opportunity.
The Millennium Challenge Corporation takes a step in the right direction by
tying financial loans and grants to performance in seventeen governance
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categories. These indicators focus on investments in education and health, con-
trol of corruption, respect for civil liberties and the rule of law, and commitment
to policies that promote political and economic freedom.5 These indicators
should be expanded and consistently applied in our relationships with African
nations. The United States is committed to democracy as the best form of gov-
ernment. Most African countries proclaim a public adherence to democracy, but
their commitment to democracy in Africa is likely to remain, for the foreseeable
future, a “mile wide and an inch thick.”6 Accordingly, the focus here should not
be on telling Africans what kind of government they must have but on how well
or how poorly an existing government is carrying out its responsibilities to its
citizens. Countries that are moving toward or consolidating democracy are
making significant gains: multiparty elections are becoming institutionalized,
and the activities of their parliaments, courts, and other institutions of govern-
ment are improving. African nations that meet the standards should be encour-
aged and supported. Those that do not meet the standards should suffer
consequences.
The World Bank measures and ranks the actions of 212 nations in six dimen-
sions of governance, and the data it collects allow officials to compare trends by
country over the past decade. The metrics are increasingly comprehensive and
use data derived by multiple sources across a wide spectrum of academic, pri-
vate, and nongovernmental organizations.7
Unfortunately, eight African countries appear in the lowest tenth percentile,
while almost all the remaining nations are in the lower fiftieth percentile. These
findings demonstrate the seriousness of the problem of poor governance and
weak institutions on the African continent. That said, Botswana and Namibia
rank among the world’s leaders in the dimension of political stability, South Af-
rica ranks in the top twenty-fifth percentile in government effectiveness, and
Botswana is in the top twenty-fifth percentile in control of corruption.8 These
performances should be held out as examples and models of what can be ac-
complished. Notably, no African nation ranks in the top twenty-fifth percen-
tile in the rule of law, and thirteen of the bottom twenty nations in this
category are African.9
Trends also provide insights. The evolution of governance standards in Côte
d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe—both of which were once among Africa’s best-governed
nations—have shown the most sharply negative trends in governance over the
past decade. On the positive side, South Africa, Algeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone,
Ghana, Niger, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are among the ten
countries showing the greatest improvement over this same period, though
some of these countries started at very low levels.10 These trends demonstrate
the profound impact that political leadership can have in both directions. At the
F U L F O R D 3 5
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same time, the distinctions among African countries caution us not to view the
continent simplistically as a “hopeless” region (as the Economist’s May 2000
cover put it). Different countries face different problems and present different
opportunities, relating to size, natural resource endowment, location, and past
political record. This calls for greater differentiation and policy nuance on the
part of the United States.
African nations require focused internal actions to improve governance as
well as international encouragement and support. Improvement will establish
the conditions necessary to achieve the vision. Failure, however, will lead to fur-
ther disenfranchisement, vulnerability to extremist ideology, and, ultimately, vi-
olent conflict.
Inconsistent application of international governance standards on the part of
the United States and other nations for economic or security reasons may pro-
vide short-term tactical advantages but will inevitably create strategic setbacks.
The recent unrest in Kenya, a close and traditional U.S. partner in East Africa,
highlights this fact. Kenya’s governance factors have been trending negatively for
some time; for example, Kenya recently overtook Nigeria as one of the most cor-
rupt nations in the world, as measured by Transparency International.11 Kenya’s
December 2007 presidential election was marred by fraud, intimidation, and
political abuse; observers unanimously labeled it as deeply flawed. Yet the
United States officially congratulated President Mwai Kabiki within a day of his
claim of victory, even before Kenyan election officials announced results. This
and similar actions from the international community probably did not trigger
the violent reaction that led to the deaths of over a thousand Kenyans, but it did
reinforce arguments by the opposition faction that the “system” was stacked
against it and that only violence would vindicate its position. Kenya’s internal
stability and the Kenya-U.S. bilateral relationship would have been much better
served had the United States withheld its approval and supported a review of
fraud allegations by Kenyan election authorities, with African Union and other
international oversight.
Generally speaking, most African governments need to show serious im-
provement in how they provide for the welfare of their citizens at the most basic
level. Responsible African leaders have formally recognized the importance of
good governance. When the African Union (which succeeded the moribund Or-
ganization of African Unity) and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development
(NEPAD) were established earlier this decade, both prescribed a peer-review
process. The idea is for nations to have their governments evaluated by knowl-
edgeable and reasonably impartial Africans, who would expose weaknesses and
highlight strengths. The United States should formulate, in conjunction with
the African Union and respected African leaders, universal standards of
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governance and apply these standards consistently across the breadth of its ac-
tivity with each nation. Thanks to NEPAD, these standards need not be imposed
in a heavy-handed way that might feed African fears of neocolonialism. Rather
than stitching the standards from whole cloth, the United States should support
and help refine and energize NEPAD’s peer-review process. This process was in-
stitutionalized specifically to temper international cynicism and build support
for African initiatives, and several nations have completed it. Unfortunately, re-
sults have not been made public; the peer-review process has been slow to
achieve its intended result. With American backing and technical assistance, the
African Union should develop a schedule for all its member nations to undergo
the peer review at least once every five years and hold its members accountable
for taking corrective action.
Security
Security—like the other aspects of any strategy toward Africa—is both complex
and multifaceted. African countries have been beset by political conflict and in-
stability over the last fifty years of independence, causing human suffering on a
massive scale and retarding economic, social, and political development.12 Suc-
cess in this realm is important, in that good governance and economic opportu-
nity have no chance without a reasonably safe and stable environment. Yet
excessive emphasis on security consumes valuable resources and opens the door
to abuse by illiberal regimes and rogue elements. Many Africans, after many
years of violent military takeovers, conflicts, and corruption, view their security
forces with fear and suspicion. Others live in fear of armed militias that weak ar-
mies and police forces cannot keep at bay. The challenge for African states is to
build professional security forces with limited resources while keeping them un-
der civil control.13 For this reason, assistance in building capability and capacity
in security structures must be accompanied by efforts to provide professional
education and training and to inculcate ethics consistent with high interna-
tional standards and in harmony with the cultural ethos of the region.
My vision is of an Africa that is committed to peaceful coexistence and inter-
national order. To achieve these goals, Africans must work harder to get along
with their neighbors; maintain awareness of activities within their borders, air-
space, and maritime regions; develop collective capacity to respond to illegal or
threatening activity; and provide local law and order forces that are respected,
not feared.
Several strong trends point in the right direction. One of them is that inter-
state conflicts are declining. However, all too frequently militias, rebels, extrem-
ists, and criminals find sanctuary just across national boundaries and use this
sanctuary to enable conflict, intimidation, or illegal activity. Borders—land,
F U L F O R D 3 7
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maritime, and air—are vast and frequently unregulated. Although larger,
better-equipped border control forces are needed, improved subregional coop-
eration growing out of greater trust and recognition of mutual interests with
neighboring states is the single most important requirement.
Another positive trend is that coups are no longer casually tolerated by the
African Union and the international community. Even when a despotic leader is
overthrown, as in Mauritania in 2005, the clear message from Africans and from
the international community has been that regime change by force will not be
condoned and that recognition, support, and relationships would be suspended
until a civil government is restored. Unfortunately, after a brief (two-year) pe-
riod with a democratically elected leader, Mauritania again finds itself under
military rule. The people of this troubled nation will suffer as the international
community suspends relationships in disapproval. This policy is sound and
should be continued, without exception. The corollary has also to be recognized:
How should the United States react when a civilian “coup d’état”—an abroga-
tion of the electoral process—happens, such as recently occurred in Kenya and,
even more egregiously, in Zimbabwe?
Further, the Peace and Security Architecture of the African Union is concep-
tually sound, though slow in actualization. The Peace and Security Council as a
major subordinate organ of the African Union works to develop programs and
concepts across the continent. The Africa Stand-By Force, the Military Staff
Committee, the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System, and
the Peace Fund are all sound, useful concepts for Africa. If these mechanisms
were fully implemented, the security of the continent would vastly improve. Un-
fortunately, organizational incapacity, limited resources, and bureaucratic leth-
argy have rendered implementation slow and weak.
In many cases, such subregional economic aggregations as the Economic
Community of West African States, the East African Community, and the
Southern African Development Community have made decisions and moved
forward absent guidance and support from the African Union. This is under-
standable and not all bad, but it will lead to problems down the way in matters of
interoperability, logistics and sustainment, and balance of forces. U.S. strategy
should strongly support the African Union and the regional economic commu-
nity organizations that show promise. Diplomatic and developmental posture
should be increased with these multilateral organizations, and AFRICOM
should have a presence nearby to offer support, assistance, and advice when
needed. This does not mean that bilateral relations should be forgone but that
bilateral support and assistance should be congruent with the goals and aims of
larger subregional and regional security plans. AFRICOM could be a very effec-
tive enabler of this approach.
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On the bilateral level, nations should be encouraged and assisted in conduct-
ing comprehensive, cross-government reviews of security force requirements.
Typically, African armies are too large, and police and judicial systems are weak
and underresourced. Likewise, most nations’ maritime and air forces are too
small and too poorly equipped to serve their security needs. Logistics, mainte-
nance, and sustainment capacities either do not exist or are far too small to meet
requirements. AFRICOM could assist through training, mentoring, and negoti-
ating affordable but effective contract-support efforts at the regional level. The
U.S. Navy’s Africa Partnership Station, which recently completed its inaugural
tour in the Gulf of Guinea, represented a significant enhancement of some of
these efforts.14
African nations should be strongly encouraged to conduct comprehensive
and realistic security reviews to identify and evaluate security threats, highlight
and understand the risks of various courses of action, commit resources prag-
matically, and develop long-term capacity-building plans to structure their se-
curity forces to meet the needs of the twenty-first century. These plans should
include agreements for regional cooperation where possible. Regional hubs for
maritime operations, air and transportation capacity, and maintenance/logisti-
cal support are all feasible and would likely garner donor support while yielding
operational efficiencies.
In their internal reviews, African nations should be urged to factor in their
contributions to the regional standby brigades and to commit themselves to en-
suring that their contributions—staff elements, infantry battalions, or engineer,
medical, or transportation elements—are organized, trained, equipped, and
prepared. Units assigned to the standby brigades should view this assignment as
one of honor, and nations should be held accountable to assign forces that are
ready and capable.
Finally, AFRICOM should be a conduit for the professional military educa-
tion of security forces in Africa. Many African officers attend military education
and training institutions in the United States, Europe, and China, and this
should be continued and encouraged. Beyond that, the effectiveness of several
war colleges and command and staff colleges on the continent could be greatly
enhanced through partnerships with U.S. professional military education insti-
tutions. Sharing research, exchanging faculty and students, and establishing vir-
tual connectivity are but a few ways in which this collaboration could
materialize and yield substantial dividends. Professional military educational
initiatives should stress links between the military, parliament, and civil society.
Other high-priority topics would include budgeting and fiscal responsibility,
democratic control, and professional ethics.
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An important operational goal of this professional education would be to ad-
vocate professional noncommissioned officer corps and to encourage and sup-
port the efforts of African nations to build them. The manpower is present, but
emphasis on training, empowering, holding accountable, and properly paying
this all-important element of African security forces is notably lacking.
AFRICOM and other allies can render much help in this area.
Economic Opportunity
Economic opportunity equates to hope. Mankind can endure hardship and
trepidation if there is hope for a better tomorrow for self and family. Too fre-
quently in Africa extreme poverty, catastrophes (natural and man-made), and
other factors combine to deny hope to citizens. Without hope, people become
disenfranchised and bitter, easy prey for extremist ideology.
Economic opportunity across the continent is heavily influenced by the
world’s growing demands for African energy resources and other commodities.
China’s growing energy thirst and greater involvement in the economies of
many African nations are particularly salient. China has brought the benefit of
cheap and durable goods to African consumers as well as investment in infra-
structure, health care, and education. China’s policy of noninterference in the
sovereign affairs of nations has provided de facto support for some of the
world’s worst despots and therefore poses an unacceptable strategic alternative
to U.S. goals concerning governance standards and practices. China’s trade with
Africa increased dramatically, from $11 billion in 2000 to $56 billion in 2006,
making it the continent’s third-largest trade partner, behind the United States
and France. Beijing’s target for African trade in 2010 is $100 billion. Over eight
hundred Chinese state-owned enterprises are active on the continent, and An-
gola has become China’s largest supplier of oil. Chinese firms have already in-
vested more than $6 billion in Africa in nine hundred projects, most heavily in
the hydrocarbon sector. U.S. policy, then, must incorporate America’s strategic
interest in ensuring commercial and physical access to hydrocarbons. American
policy should also recognize that while Africa’s hope resides in the economic op-
portunity latent in its natural resources, especially oil, its potential for benefiting
the African people at large has thus far been squandered. Reversing this trend
calls for building both human capital and physical infrastructure.
Achieving the vision in this sphere will be neither quick nor easy, but it is at-
tainable. On the human side, the focus must be on health care and education, in
order to build a competitive labor force for the twenty-first century. It may take a
generation or more, but ensuring that all children have access to schools is a man-
datory first step. African nations must take the lead in promoting opportunities
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for children to go to school; they must re-create a culture that emphasizes the im-
portance of education for all children.
Public-private partnerships can help. I have been in schools on the continent
that have no books, no paper or chairs, where dozens of eager children sit on the
ground listening to a teacher as she writes on a slate board. If schools in the
United States adopted sister schools in villages in Africa and donated books and
supplies, the schools in Africa would benefit and the children, who are the future
of Africa, would be durably grateful.
What is lacking on the part of the United States is not material, however, but
bureaucratic attention and coordination. In 2002, for example, the Bush admin-
istration launched the Africa Education Initiative and committed itself to pro-
vide $600 million over eight years to increase access to quality basic education.
In 2007, the President’s Expanded Education for the World’s Poorest Children
was announced, with an additional $525 million over five years.15 The United
States Agency for International Development (USAID) recently introduced the
Basic Education Initiative and asked the U.S. Congress to appropriate over $600
million in fiscal year 2009 to support basic educational programs worldwide.16
This initiative should continue and grow, and much more effective coordination
should be put in place across U.S. government agencies working in Africa.
Likewise, through the Malaria Initiative and the President’s Emergency Plan
for AIDS Relief, the United States has done a great deal to improve health care in
Africa. However, much remains to be done. Two-thirds of HIV/AIDS-infected
persons worldwide live in Africa.17 African statistics in birth mortality (the aver-
age life spans of both mothers and children are at the bottom of the world’s aver-
ages) reflect the inadequate health care infrastructure across the continent.
African children under five die at twice the rate of those in the developing world
as a whole. The odds that a sub-Saharan African woman will die from complica-
tions of pregnancy and childbirth are one in sixteen, compared to one in 3,800 in
the developed world.18 Almost half the population does not have access to clean,
safe drinking water, and two-thirds lack basic sewage and waste disposal sys-
tems.19 This situation is exacerbated by the flight of trained health care workers
seeking higher-paying jobs in Europe and the United States. The international
community can and should increase efforts to help. Again, this is best led by
NGOs and private organizations on a local level.
Food security is the next area that needs attention. Nature is not kind to vast
areas of the continent; droughts and other natural disasters routinely threaten
the food supply. Still, there are large swaths of Africa that could serve as fertile
food baskets for the continent. Countries like Nigeria and Zimbabwe were once
food exporters that now, for different reasons, must now rely on imports or food
aid. Good internal agriculture programs and governmental incentives in these
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countries can turn this situation around. In the 2006–2007 growing season, Ma-
lawi doubled its agricultural productivity through United Nations assistance
with fertilizers and seeds.20 The U.S. Department of Agriculture and USAID can
assist many other countries with twenty-first-century agro-technology that can
turn them into bountiful food producers.
Electricity is another critical dimension of infrastructure, one requiring ad-
ministrative focus as well as resources. More modern and better-maintained hy-
droelectric plants along the Congo and Zambezi rivers could provide clean,
efficient, low-cost energy for much of south and central Africa. The U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and other public-private
ventures could facilitate such development with investment support from the
World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the Millennium Challenge
Corporation.
Transportation in Africa also needs serious help. Most of the road and rail
networks on the continent were built to provide access from the interior to the
ocean ports to carry extracted resources for shipment. Even now, China is re-
pairing and modernizing a railroad from Zambia through Tanzania to support
the extraction of copper from a mine China has purchased in Zambia. Both
Zambia and Tanzania will benefit from this rail line, as will China. But more
needs to be done within the continent to build and repair roads, railways, and
navigable waterways that will encourage intercontinental trade and exchange as
well as port and harbor improvements that will ease export operations. It would
be in the strategic interest of the United States, as well as helpful to African part-
ners, for Washington to play a leading role in developing these transportation
networks.
If Africans are to realize value from their goods, they must be able to trade
them with fewer hurdles and costs. The costs of interior transportation to major
capitals can be five times higher than for shipping from African ports to markets
in Europe, Asia, or North America. Part of this is due to low volumes, bad roads,
and lack of competition. But corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy is also a major
factor.
The United States could do Africa an enormous service and promote its own
interests by acting as an agent for change of multilateral international trade rules
on behalf of African governments. It has much to gain diplomatically, commer-
cially, and strategically by doing so.
The United States should adopt a comprehensive strategy in its activities with
African nations and institutions. The United States should engage international
partners, challenging them to lead, follow, or get out of the way. Most impor-
tantly, the United States should work more closely with well disposed African
4 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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partners to improve their governance, security, and economic opportunity. It is
the morally right thing to do; it demonstrates American intentions to maintain
ethical balance; and it is in our own strategic interests. America can demonstrate
its true greatness while helping worthy African citizens attain a better life.
A new administration with focused priorities, using all the tools of our na-
tion, including a fully operational Africa Command, is positioned to accomplish
the recommendations of this article and to help African nations attain the vi-
sion. In the words of that great corporate philosopher Nike—“Just do it!”
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